Declassify 1962 India-China war report, reappraise the civil – military relations

The release of a portion of the ‘top secret’ T.B. Henderson Brooks – Premindra Singh Bhagat inquiry report on the 1962 India-China war by an Australian journalist Neville Maxwell has come at a time when the civil – military relations are under the scanner all over again, due in no small part to the allegedly inappropriate conduct of a former Chief of Army Staff who dragged the government to court over his age row and how an otherwise routine movement of troops coinciding with the date of court hearing gave rise to fears in the government of a possible ‘coup’; the unseemly controversy surrounding the frequent crashes by Soviet-era MiG fighter jets; and most recently, a series of naval mishaps that eventually led to the resignation of the Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi.

Let us look at the substantive portions of the 126-page section of the report that was released online by Neville Maxwell, who was the Delhi correspondent of the Times of London during the war. For one, the report squarely attributes the debacle to an unsound military plan. It goes on to blame the then army leadership, the intelligence apparatus, the bureaucrats in the ministries of defence and external affairs, and the political class, not necessarily in that order, for the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. The army leadership, for overruling the field commanders; the intelligence chief, for assuming, erroneously, that the Chinese would not resort to use of force; and the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, for pushing for a ‘Forward Policy’ of establishing military outposts in areas claimed by China and launching aggressive patrols without the necessary army wherewithal.

The report notes, among other things, the following:

* The government who politically must have been keen to recover territory advocated a cautious policy whilst Army HQ dictated a policy that was clearly militarily unsound.

* The Chief of Army Staff did not present the correct military assessment to the political leadership on the forward policy in spite of the fact that the military intelligence believed that China would retaliate against any move by India to reclaim territory.

* A meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s Office on 2 November 1961 which was attended among others by the defence minister, the foreign secretary, the Chief of Army Staff and the director Intelligence Bureau (DIB). It appears that the DIB was of the opinion that the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.

The Ministry of Defence has sought to take refuge under the pretext that the inquiry committee report remains top secret because of the extremely sensitive nature of its contents “which are of current operational value.” Some scholars have debunked the government’s claim, saying that declassification of the report would not hinder or jeopardise in any manner the contemporary political and military attitudes and affairs. On the contrary, they have argued, it was necessary in the interest of generating an open and honest debate in the country about the circumstances leading up to the war so that the right lessons could be drawn. It has been pointed out that the government ought to take the nation into confidence and encourage a critical analysis of what went wrong and how to avoid a repetition in the future. As a newspaper editorial said, “There needs, instead, be a thorough reading of the report and the manner of its eventual public availability for a tutorial on India’s inexplicably ostrich-like approach to archival material. If today we are reacting to the report as if it were still 1963, given the lack of clarity on military assessment of operational details, it reflects the state’s reluctance to allow access to material essential for proper history writing, the kind of history without which there cannot be coherent and informed public debate.”

The release of a section of the report is a wake-up call of sorts for the Indian political and military leadership. To quote a former diplomat Hardeep S Puri, “The contents of the report point to three extremely disturbing trends that were in evidence in the 1960s. Some of these have continuing relevance even 52 years later. These merit a full national debate in order to prevent the recurrence of a 1962-type fiasco. They relate to a continuing civil-military disconnect, serious gaps in training and provisioning of equipment, inadequate or flawed intelligence which contributed to bizarre decision-making at the army headquarters and by the political leadership in the ministries of defence and external affairs, and at the PMO.”

India would do well to reappraise its civil – military relations unless, of course, it wants to go down the path that George Santayana so eloquently warned against: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Post-2014 Afghanistan: Back to the Future?

New Delhi

28 July 2013

Hamid Karzai, president
of Afghanistan

As Afghanistan prepares for life beyond 2014 its capital Kabul is seeing a steady stream of visitors from far and near, all seeking to reassure and to be reassured themselves that peace and stability will return to the landlocked country torn apart by conflict for the last 33 years. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd paid a surprise visit to Afghanistan on July 27; his country has about 1,500 troops there but the bulk will be pulled out by the end of this year. Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz of Pakistan and British premier David Cameron were there, too, as was the US’s Af-Pak envoy James Dobbins. An Indian delegation comprising officials from the ministries of external affairs and defence travelled to Kabul in the second week of July to follow up on Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi in the month of May with a wish list of items he would like the Indian government to share with the Afghan national army and allied security forces as the US completes pulling out its troops by the end of next year.

What should have been a moment of quiet satisfaction, reflective of the enormous goodwill India enjoys among the Afghan people and government alike for funding development projects worth billions of dollars, has turned into an embarrassment of sorts as President Karzai’s wish list has exposed the limits to what India can, and is willing to, do to shore up a post-2014 Afghanistan. It was quick to waitlist Karzai’s inventory of lethal materiel rpt materiel on the ground that there are many moving parts to the Afghan conundrum, namely Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan and India, the Taliban’s own game plan, the moves for a possible reconciliation with the Taliban (as evidenced by the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar) and the extent of Pakistan’s role in it, the ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in the immediate future and last but not the least the eventual successor to Mr Karzai following the elections.

Notwithstanding New Delhi’s contention that while it is there for the long haul it would not want to “become part of the problem”, Kabul maintains that the Afghan national security forces must be equipped with the 

A map of Afghanistan (for
illustrative purposes only)

necessary capabilities – including capacity for logistics and equipment maintenance as well as adequate ground and air firepower – to execute independent operations against conventional and unconventional enemies. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in October 2011, which dwelled on security, trade, capacity-building and people-to-people contacts. Specifically, India agreed "to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces". Therefore, Kabul’s desire to source hardware with Indian assistance should be viewed in that context. But if the Afghans were disappointed by New Delhi’s circumspection, they did not show it. As Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali put it, “In the post 2014 period, we look forward to working with India .... At the same time, we renew our call on the international community to stay the course in Afghanistan.”

So could Afghanistan descend into chaos after 2014? While jury is still out on that, serving and former Afghan officials are of the considered view that the road to peace in Kabul goes through Islamabad. An Afghan diplomatic source insists that the Taliban leadership continues to receive protection from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments. Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi believes that Pakistan could end the Afghan war "in weeks" because “the Taliban are under their control". A former Afghan intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, in turn, says that some of the Western powers are in such a hurry to cut and run from Afghanistan that they are eager to differentiate between the threats posed by the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda and to downplay the dangers posed by a return of the Taliban (similar to how the chaos after the erstwhile USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan gave rise to the Taliban.) Ironically, this view is in contrast to New Delhi’s which has of late adopted a nuanced position on the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban; at a recent Asean meeting in Brunei External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said India supported Kabul’s efforts to establish a dialogue with all armed opposition groups, “including the Taliban”. For now, Abdali is confident that his country will not go the Iraq way from where the US troops withdrew in December 2011 but which continues to be riven by civil strife, or, resemble the days of the Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. “Let me assure you against the 2014 myth of Afghanistan falling apart after the withdrawal of NATO forces from our country,” says Abdali. Watch this space!

With eye on China, India to host trilateral talks with Japan, US this year; Japan does not fancy the Quadrilateral with Australia

New Delhi
29 June 2011

For Japan, three is not a crowd. Four maybe. While it agrees that a more robust Asian security architecture will be required if China's opaque military modernisation continues, for now it will be content with trilateral or three-waysecurity dialogues involving India, Australia and the United States, without giving it the shape of a Quadrilateral or resurrecting notions of containing China. Currently, Japan has trilateral dialogues with the US and India; with the US and Australia; and with China and South Korea. India is the third country, after the US and Australia, with which Japan has the two-plus-two talks involving foreign and defence ministers. New Delhi is expected to host the inaugural India-US-Japan trilateral dialogue later this year. It will be conducted by officials, and not by foreign ministers as was mentioned in the April 8 press release issued by the ministry of external affairs after foreign secretary Nirupama Rao's talks in Tokyo. Besides discussing anti-piracy cooperation and maritime security, the talks could progressively extend to cover security and defence cooperation.

China's military rise has caused concerns in the region and beyond. Without naming China, Australian defence minister Stephen Smith recently said, "All we ask in terms of a growth of military capacity is that one is transparent as to its strategic intentions". That view is shared by Tokyo. "We keep asking the Chinese what is your intention

[but] unfortunately we have not received a convincing explanation," AKITAKA SAIKI, Japan'snew ambassador to India, said Wednesday in an interaction at the Observer ResearchFoundation here. "While Japan has no intention to undermine good neighbourly relations with China, I hope China will be a little more sensitive to concerns expressed by its neighbours. Actions need to match words, that's my view," he observed. Mr Saiki cautioned that the future trajectory of trilateral talks would depend on Beijing's attitude.

The current Japanese sentiment stands in contrast to the churning in Australia, which has instituted a Defence Force Posture Review for addressing issues such as "the growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific" -- an indirect reference to China's reach and influence. In a recent interaction with this newspaper, Michael Auslin from the US-based American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, said that Australia, not post-tsunami Japan, could be the lead partner in the Quadrilateral. Dr John Lee from the Sydney-based Centre for Independent Studies, in turn, cited the increasing possibility of Australia lifting the ban on uranium sale to India to suggest that the perception of Australia drifting towards China was not true.

The Quadrilateral was an initiative of Shinzo Abe, who was the Japanese premier from September 2006 to September 2007. On September 4, 2007, the navies of India, Japan, the US, Australia and Singapore conducted joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal. However, later that year, Australia's then newly elected prime minister and currentforeign minister Kevin Rudd unilaterally withdrew from the Quadrilateral Initiative. The strategic pact has remained stillborn ever since. It suffered another setback after Abe's Liberal Democratic Party lost power to the Democratic Party in 2009. India did not show any particular interest, either. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in Beijing inJanuary 2008 that India was "not part of any so-called 'contain China' effort".