India - Sri Lanka: Time for reshaping New Delhi's neighbourhood policy

This article was published by www.rediff.com on 28 March 2014 under the headline "Time for reshaping India's neighbourhood policy" and by www.atimes.com on 31 March 2014 under the headline "UN vote shows strains in Delhi's diplomacy":

President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India

Abstaining from voting on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka was dictated as much by necessity and self-preservation as by a desire to place bilateralism at the front and centre of New Delhi’s ties with Colombo, says Ramesh Ramachandran.

In a departure from its hitherto familiar voting pattern on United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions critical of Sri Lanka, India on Thursday abstained from casting its vote on the resolution that approved an independent international investigation into certain alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by the government of Sri Lanka during the 2009 civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

The customary ‘explanation of vote’ by the permanent representative of India to the UN offices in Geneva said, among other things, that: 

* “In asking the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate, assess and monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, the resolution ignores the progress already made by the country in this field and places in jeopardy the cooperation currently taking place between the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR and the council’s special procedures. Besides, the resolution is inconsistent and impractical in asking both the government of Sri Lanka and the OHCHR to simultaneously conduct investigations”;

* “India believes that it is imperative for every country to have the means of addressing human rights violations through robust national mechanisms. The council’s efforts should therefore be in a direction to enable Sri Lanka to investigate all allegations of human rights violations through comprehensive, independent and credible national investigative mechanisms and bring to justice those found guilty. Sri Lanka should be provided all assistance it desires in a cooperative and collaborative manner”; and

* “It has been India’s firm belief that adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive.”

After having voted for the UNHRC resolutions on Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013, India’s abstention this year is indicative of a course correction in New Delhi’s engagement with Colombo that is aimed at retrieving the ground lost in the intervening years, burnishing India’s credentials as a relevant player in the island nation’s affairs and signalling a return to bilateralism as the centrepiece of India-Sri Lanka ties (not necessarily in that order).

If India’s support for the resolutions in the previous years exposed an utter bankruptcy of ideas on how to engage with Sri Lanka (thereby implicitly admitting to a failure on the part of New Delhi to either influence the course of events or bring about the desired change in Colombo’s disposition), the abstention should be seen as a belated attempt to pull the relationship back from the brink.

Of course, it helped that the reaction from the regional parties was muted this year and that gave New Delhi extra room for manoeuvre, enabling it in the process to regain its voice vis-a-vis the states on foreign policy matters.

It needs to be said here that India cannot claim to adhere to a consistent policy towards Sri Lanka. First it nurtured the LTTE and burnt its fingers in the process. Then it extended a tacit support to Colombo -- before, during and after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in May 2009 -- only to later, in its wisdom, support the UNHRC resolution piloted by the United States. The 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting summit in Sri Lanka was as much in the news for the renewed focus on the human rights record of the host nation as for the decision by the prime minister of India not to take part in it. In his stead it was left to External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to lead the Indian delegation for the biennial event of the 53-nation Commonwealth.

In a letter of regret that was hand-delivered to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Singh informed Rajapaksa of his inability to attend personally but he did not assign any reasons for it. Suffice it to say that a careful reading of the history of India-Sri Lanka relations would make it evident to just about anyone that India’s policy towards this island-nation in the Indian Ocean can be described as consistently inconsistent, characterised by myopia and self-inflicted crises.

For the ministry of external affairs, what should be particularly worrying is the erosion in India’s standing, in what it calls, its sphere of influence. The recent debate over which way India should vote on a UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka is instructive to the extent that it illustrated how far India has come from being an influential actor in its neighbourhood to being a marginal or fringe player.

Put simply (not simplistically), some of the key questions were: Is it advisable for New Delhi to vote for the resolutions and risk losing whatever goodwill and leverage it might have had with Colombo? Should not all other options have been exhausted before India (figuratively) threw in the towel and (literally) threw in its lot with the West? Thursday’s abstention has partially answered that question. However, there remains another worry:

The protestations from Tamil Nadu chief minister J Jayalalithaa and her rival and DMK patriarch M Karunanidhi over India’s vote on Sri Lanka in 2012, coming as they did a few months after West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee ‘vetoed’ an agreement on the sharing of the Teesta river waters with Bangladesh, injected a certain degree of dissonance in the conduct of foreign policy. What fuelled the diplomats’ anxiety was the precedent that would be set if the Centre caved in or succumbed to the states on matters that fell in the Union Government’s realm. Already, India’s engagement of Pakistan on one hand and China and Burma on the other are determined to an extent by the domestic conditions prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, respectively. 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh betrayed his frustration when he said in the Lok Sabha that difficult decisions were getting more difficult because of coalition compulsions. He called for bipartisanship in the interest of the country. At the same time, what cannot be denied is that there exists a view among a section of serving and former practitioners of diplomacy that devolution of foreign policy to more stakeholders than what is currently assumed should not be entirely unwelcome.

As a former foreign secretary told this writer, “Foreign policy today is made not only in New Delhi but elsewhere, too. There are multiple stakeholders and one can’t deny states a say in foreign policy if it relates to them.” In other words, it is argued that if the states assert their rights and/or seek more consultations, then the Centre must respect those sentiments.

Having said that, an impression seems to be gaining ground, erroneously at that, that foreign policy is the worst sufferer of this nouveau phenomenon of the states having their say in matters pertaining to foreign policy. A cursory look at recent years would show that the states have consistently been vocal on a host of other issues, too. The recent examples of certain states or regional parties opposing the policy of raising the cap on FDI (foreign direct investment) in single-brand retail is a case in point. As is the opposition to the Centre’s proposal for setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre.

In some of these cases New Delhi chose to yield, albeit temporarily, but in some others it had its way. Therefore, it would not be accurate to suggest that regional influences are wielding a ‘veto’ over New Delhi. Also, it would not be fair to either paint the states as villains of the piece or to apportion all the blame for the Centre’s foreign policy woes to regional parties that are, or could be, aligned against it in the political arena.

For instance, the Centre accuses the West Bengal government headed by the Trinamool Congress party of scuttling a river waters sharing agreement with Bangladesh. However, the Congress, which heads the ruling coalition at the Centre and also in Kerala, is guilty of playing to narrow political sentiments, too, as was evidenced by the state government’s and the party’s stand on the two Italian marines who are facing murder charges for the deaths of two Indian fishermen off the Kerala coast.

On balance, it is time for reshaping India’s neighbourhood policy in a manner that it reflects the broadest possible national consensus on the way forward in reshaping ties with countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. A reset is imperative, irrespective of which coalition forms the next government in New Delhi. India can ill-afford a Pavlovian foreign policy.

Equally, framing India’s foreign policy options as a binary choice can be self-defeating. There needs to be a dispassionate debate and a greater appreciation of various shades of grey (pun unintended.)

Post-2014 Afghanistan: Back to the Future?

New Delhi

28 July 2013

Hamid Karzai, president
of Afghanistan

As Afghanistan prepares for life beyond 2014 its capital Kabul is seeing a steady stream of visitors from far and near, all seeking to reassure and to be reassured themselves that peace and stability will return to the landlocked country torn apart by conflict for the last 33 years. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd paid a surprise visit to Afghanistan on July 27; his country has about 1,500 troops there but the bulk will be pulled out by the end of this year. Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz of Pakistan and British premier David Cameron were there, too, as was the US’s Af-Pak envoy James Dobbins. An Indian delegation comprising officials from the ministries of external affairs and defence travelled to Kabul in the second week of July to follow up on Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi in the month of May with a wish list of items he would like the Indian government to share with the Afghan national army and allied security forces as the US completes pulling out its troops by the end of next year.

What should have been a moment of quiet satisfaction, reflective of the enormous goodwill India enjoys among the Afghan people and government alike for funding development projects worth billions of dollars, has turned into an embarrassment of sorts as President Karzai’s wish list has exposed the limits to what India can, and is willing to, do to shore up a post-2014 Afghanistan. It was quick to waitlist Karzai’s inventory of lethal materiel rpt materiel on the ground that there are many moving parts to the Afghan conundrum, namely Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan and India, the Taliban’s own game plan, the moves for a possible reconciliation with the Taliban (as evidenced by the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar) and the extent of Pakistan’s role in it, the ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in the immediate future and last but not the least the eventual successor to Mr Karzai following the elections.

Notwithstanding New Delhi’s contention that while it is there for the long haul it would not want to “become part of the problem”, Kabul maintains that the Afghan national security forces must be equipped with the 

A map of Afghanistan (for
illustrative purposes only)

necessary capabilities – including capacity for logistics and equipment maintenance as well as adequate ground and air firepower – to execute independent operations against conventional and unconventional enemies. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in October 2011, which dwelled on security, trade, capacity-building and people-to-people contacts. Specifically, India agreed "to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces". Therefore, Kabul’s desire to source hardware with Indian assistance should be viewed in that context. But if the Afghans were disappointed by New Delhi’s circumspection, they did not show it. As Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali put it, “In the post 2014 period, we look forward to working with India .... At the same time, we renew our call on the international community to stay the course in Afghanistan.”

So could Afghanistan descend into chaos after 2014? While jury is still out on that, serving and former Afghan officials are of the considered view that the road to peace in Kabul goes through Islamabad. An Afghan diplomatic source insists that the Taliban leadership continues to receive protection from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments. Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi believes that Pakistan could end the Afghan war "in weeks" because “the Taliban are under their control". A former Afghan intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, in turn, says that some of the Western powers are in such a hurry to cut and run from Afghanistan that they are eager to differentiate between the threats posed by the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda and to downplay the dangers posed by a return of the Taliban (similar to how the chaos after the erstwhile USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan gave rise to the Taliban.) Ironically, this view is in contrast to New Delhi’s which has of late adopted a nuanced position on the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban; at a recent Asean meeting in Brunei External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said India supported Kabul’s efforts to establish a dialogue with all armed opposition groups, “including the Taliban”. For now, Abdali is confident that his country will not go the Iraq way from where the US troops withdrew in December 2011 but which continues to be riven by civil strife, or, resemble the days of the Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. “Let me assure you against the 2014 myth of Afghanistan falling apart after the withdrawal of NATO forces from our country,” says Abdali. Watch this space!

INDIA WAITLISTS KARZAI'S WISH LIST !

Karzai, Singh discuss roadmap for 2014 and beyond

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan shakes hands with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on Tuesday (Picture courtesy: Prime Minister's Office)

New Delhi
21 May 2013

The situation that will obtain in Afghanistan after the presidential elections in April 2014 and the subsequent withdrawal of international troops from the country before that year ends, not to mention the protection of Indian interests and investments made in the war-ravaged, landlocked country over the years, would have weighed on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s mind as he hosted President Hamid Karzai for talks in New Delhi on Tuesday. That, when taken together with President Karzai’s stated desire to broaden and deepen security ties with India, including, but not limited to, the supply of weapons and other military hardware for the Afghan forces, set this round of talks apart from previous ones. Afghan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali prefaced the Karzai-Singh meeting by asserting that “we would like to go beyond the current trend of co-operation between the two countries in the defence sector. So, we would like to have both lethal and non-lethal assistance to our defence forces in Afghanistan.”

Kabul maintains that the Afghan national security forces must be equipped with the necessary capabilities – including capacity for logistics and equipment maintenance as well as adequate ground and air firepower – to execute independent operations against conventional and unconventional enemies. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement in October 2011, which dwelled on security, trade, capacity-building and people-to-people contacts. Specifically, India agreed "to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces". Therefore, Kabul’s desire to source hardware with Indian assistance must be viewed in that context.

According to Ashraf Haidari, deputy chief of mission of the Afghan embassy in India who has served as Afghanistan’s deputy assistant national security adviser and deputy chief of mission of the Afghan embassy in the US, “the Taliban leadership continues to receive protection from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments.” He buttressed his argument by pointing out that “without an external sanctuary, sustainable funding, weapons supplies, and intelligence support in Pakistan, the Taliban would be unable to reconsolidate its control over Afghanistan. Since 2003, the Taliban and its affiliated networks have gradually expanded their influence in the ungoverned southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, launching daily terrorist attacks that have injured and killed thousands of innocent civilians.”

While India was expected to lend a sympathetic ear to President Karzai, how soon and to what extent will it be able to satisfy Afghanistan on this count will be a function of India's own assessment of the unfolding situation situation in the Af-Pak region. Adding to New Delhi’s anxieties is that there are many moving parts to the Afghan conundrum, namely Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan and India, the Taliban’s own gameplan, the moves for a possible reconciliation with the Taliban and the extent of Pakistan’s role in it, the possibility of a greater Chinese involvement subsequent to the US pullout, the ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in the immediate future and last but not the least the eventual successor to Mr Karzai following the presidential elections to be held in April 2014. That may explain India’s circumspection, as evidenced by the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson’s remarks that while Afghanistan is a “strategically important” neighbour, India will “continue to discuss and respond to specific requests of the Afghan government ... within our own modest means as a developing country”.

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan holds talks with
President Pranab Mukherjee (Courtesy: Government of India)

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) were not forthcoming with details on the Karzai-Singh talks. It was left to Rashtrapati Bhavan to articulate India’s views which it did by putting out a press statement quoting President Pranab Mukherjee as telling his Afghan counterpart that India was prepared to increase bilateral contribution to Afghanistan’s institution-building, training and equipment “to the extent [it] can” and that India would stand by Afghanistan during its critical period of transition. Earlier in the day, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid told journalists that India was already assisting Afghanistan with doing capacity-building, non-lethal military hardware, communication and transport equipment. “He (Karzai) may have a wish list and with which he may go to our Prime Minister but these are ongoing... which will all be discussed within the parameters of what our capacity is, what our philosophy is, we would help them as a friend,” Khurshid elaborated.

From President Karzai’s perspective there are three other issues that continue to engage his government’s attention. One is the tensions with Pakistan on the Durand Line, which has been cited by Karzai’s spokesman Aimal Faizi on more than one occasion. The second is the recognition that Afghanistan is vulnerable to transnational security threats, stemming in particular from the narcotics trade and terrorism. The third issue, which is of a more immediate concern to his government, is the lack of coordination among international donors or partners. Although the diversity of nations present in Afghanistan demonstrates international goodwill and consensus for supporting the country, Kabul feels each contributing nation has pursued its own aid strategies, effectively bypassing coordination with each other and the Afghan government. Hence, a lack of strategic coordination across international military and civilian efforts to ensure aid effectiveness has so far crippled the Afghan state and left it with no capacity or resources to deliver basic services to its people.

For landlocked Afghanistan, access to a sea port is particularly vital. This specific need can be met to a certain extent by India’s collaboration with Iran for developing the Chabahar port and linking it to Afghanistan by a network of roads. At the same time, Kabul is acutely aware that its location should help it serve as a regional trade and transit hub for easy movement of goods and natural resources to meet the rising energy demands of India and China. Incidentally, Afghanistan was discussed at some length by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when they met on Monday. India has also been discussing Afghanistan with a host of other countries in the region and beyond, notably Iran, Russia and the US, besides international fora.

It was President Karzai’s 12th visit to India, and the second in the last six months. He paid a courtesy call on President Pranab Mukherjee and addressed industry representatives, too. In his address to the captains of Indian industry, President Karzai called for Indian investments in healthcare, agriculture and telecommunications in Afghanistan. He pointed out that agriculture was a priority sector for Afghanistan as it accounts for 36 per cent of its GDP and supports 85 per cent of the Afghan population. Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul, Afghanistan ambassador to India Shaida Abdali, Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan Gautam Mukhopadhaya and other senior officials were present on the occasion.

Video of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan's meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on Tuesday (Courtesy: Prime Minister's Office)

No Geronimo-like operation for India

New Delhi

4 May 2011

India has sought to put a lid on the debate about whether it can or should copy American-style surgical strikes or Israeli targeted assassinations to eliminate targets inside Pakistan by saying that it is an idea whose time may never come.

An official source says India would not want to emulate the US or Israel because one, India is not US, and two, India's relations with Pakistan are historically and qualitatively different from Washington's ties with Islamabad.

The source pointed out that India is conscious of the fact that while Pakistan may be a

"foreign" country in the strict sense of the word, it was a "part of us", and it behoves

India to take a sober and reasoned view of the relationship.

"It is easy to be hawkish on Pakistan but the story won't end [with the] capture of one or

two [individuals]," the source said, before going on to emphasise that dismantling of the

infrastructure of terrorism will require a change in Pakistan's mindset.

Further, the source noted, "[The] idea is not to bring Pakistan to its knees[.] It is not an

exercise [in] retribution, [to] humiliate [Pakistan.]"

The remarks come at a time when some Indians, analysts and retired military officers

included, are wondering why their country must not emulate the Americans and liquidate

some of the most wanted fugitives from Indian law.

The chiefs of the Indian army and air force, too, have commented saying that the Indian

armed forces were competent to carry out an Abbottabad-like operation, and that India

was capable of taking out the 26/11 perpetrators inside Pakistan.

The source said that it was "logical to deduce" that many of the terrorists wanted in India

for acts of terrorism were inside Pakistan, and acknowledged the "frustration" of many

Indians at not seeing them brought to justice.

While India has "drawn a blank" insofar as the terrorists hiding in Pakistan were

concerned, it has had some success in getting 16 or 17 persons deported from Dubai, it

was pointed out.

India's Af-Pak policy comes under strain

New Delhi

3 May 2011

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's disengagement-is-not-an-option line came under increased strain Tuesday following Pakistan's unhelpful attitude on the issue of bringing the 26/11 perpetrators to justice.

Salman Bashir, Pakistan's foreign secretary, dismissed New Delhi's demand for action against the 26/11 terrorists, reiterated most recently by home minister P Chidambaram on Monday, as "outdated".

"It is a familiar line (and) outdated. It is some part of the old system repeating itself[.]

This line of thinking is mired in a mindset that is neither realistic nor productive. Such

statements are not very helpful [to the peace process]," Bashir said.

However, indications are that Prime Minister Singh was likely to stay the course in spite

of pressure on him to reappraise his Pakistan initiative and to craft an appropriate

Afghanistan strategy in the post-Osama bin Laden era.

There was a view in official circles that India must persist with the dialogue, if
it does not want to fritter away the gains made in official and unofficial (track-
two) talks with Islamabad, and if it wants the 'Mohali spirit' to survive.

The prime ministers of India and Pakistan would get at least two opportunities to re-engage each other, on the margins of the Saarc summit in Maldives in November this year, and on the sidelines of the July 2012 NAM summit in Iran.

A section of the official circles said that it became even imperative that New Delhi

brought diplomatic pressure to bear upon Islamabad, given its inability or reluctance to

mount covert operations inside Pakistan.

Also, it was pointed out that Prime Minister Singh need only take a cue from his British

counterpart, David Cameron, who said that the world must remain engaged with Pakistan

if only to strengthen the hands of the civilian government there.

Cameron had accused Pakistan of looking "both ways" on terrorism in July 2010, and his

words were only now finding a resonance in Washington and other world capitals

following Pakistan's alleged complicity in harbouring Osama bin Laden.